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Abstract—We propose PICARD (ProbabIlistic Contract on
AndRoiD), a framework to detect repackaged applications
for Android smartphones based upon probabilistic contract
matching. A contract describes the sequences of actions that
an application is allowed to perform at run-time, i.e. its legal
behavior. In PICARD, contracts are generated from the set
of traces that represent the usage profile of the application.
Both the contract and the application’s run-time behavior
are represented through clustered probabilistic automata. At
run-time, a monitoring system verifies the compliance of the
application trace with the contract. This approach is useful in
detecting repackaged applications, whose behavior is strongly
similar to the original application but it differs only from small
paths in the traces.
In this paper, we discuss the framework of PICARD for
describing and generating contracts through probabilistic au-
tomata and introduce the notion of ActionNode, a cluster of
related system calls. Then, we present a first set of results
using a prototype implementation of PICARD for Android
smartphones to prove the efficacy of the framework in detecting
two classes of applications, repackaged and trojanized ones.
Keywords-Probabilistic contract; Android; Malware;
Repackaging;
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile devices, such as smartphones and tablets, are
becoming day-by-day more pervasive. Current operative
systems for mobile devices are based upon the concept of
apps. Apps are lightweight applications that are distributed
through on-line marketplaces, such as the Apple AppStore
or Android Google Play. Using this paradigm, users browse
apps on markets and install them directly on their devices.
This app-based model has been ported also on desktops
and laptops, e.g. on the new Microsoft operative system
Windows 8. However, this model is affected by some secu-
rity and trust issues. As an example, some applications are
produced by third-party developers, which can be malicious
ones, and some markets do not ensure the security and
quality of the published applications.
A large number of Trojan-like malware has been found
hidden in applications distributed in the Android markets
[1]. These applications are also known as repackaged appli-
cations, because they look and work as genuine applications,
but they hide inside new code that misbehaves in the
background, e.g. by contacting fake advertisement sites.
A similar problem comes from Trojanized applications, a
special class of repackaged applications that have malware
inserted into them: nowadays, Trojanized applications are
more than 80% of the total malware [2]. The detection of
repackaged applications can be hard, since the observable
behavior, from the user-side, of a good application is mostly
the same as of a repackaged version.
In this paper, we propose PICARD (ProbabIlistic Contract
on AndRoiD), a framework aimed at detecting repackaged
applications based upon probabilistic contracts. Contracts
describe the sequences of actions that an application is
allowed to perform when running. At run-time, the PICARD
monitoring system verifies the compliance of the application
trace with its contract using probabilistic contract matching.
The main contributions of this paper are:
• PICARD, a system that defines a contract of Android
applications through probabilistic automata, which are
computed from the application system call traces;
• the definition of ActionNode as a cluster of related
system calls, represented through an oriented graph;
• the definition of probabilistic contracts and a method to
verify the application compliance at run-time with the
contract or to detect repackaged/trojanized applications;
• a first prototype of PICARD and a set of experiments
on real repackaged and trojanized applications to prove
the effectiveness of PICARD.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Sect. II we give some background information about appli-
cation contracts and their generation. Section III discusses
PICARD and the method to describe applications’ behavior
through probabilistic automata and present the concept of
ActionNode. Section IV describes the contract matching
technique that is used to detect misbehaviors. In Sect. V
we report some experiments to prove the effectiveness of
our approach. Section VI reports some related works on
system calls monitoring and probabilistic automata. Finally,
Sect. VII concludes and proposes some future extensions.
II. CONTRACT
In this section, we give some background notions on
contracts and application certification.
A contract fully describes the expected behavior of an
application. A contract can be defined using information that
can be computed either statically or dynamically. In the first
case, the contract can be built by learning some properties
from the source code or from a intermediate-level language
(e.g., byte-code) or directly from the binary code. With this
approach, it may be impossible to know in advance some
properties of the code, e.g. behavior of the application that
depends about some inputs, such as configuration files read
at run-time. Usually, with this approach, when matching the
contract with the application run-time behavior, there are no
false positives (since the static analysis over-approximates
the set of legal actions), but more false negatives may arise.
Alternatively, a contract can be defined by exploting the
information learnt from the application’s executions, e.g.
by monitoring some executions of the program to extract
its behavior. In this scenario, to faithfully represent the
application behavior, two conditions must be met: (i) all
the possible actions should be generated so they can be
monitored, otherwise false positives may arise at run-time;
(ii) the device is not attacked during this phase, otherwise
false negatives may arise at run-time.
When matching the application run-time behavior with
the contract, the advantages of the dynamic approach are,
usually, a reduction of the false negative occurrences. In
fact, a contract that is defined using information dynamically
generated should better represent the real executions of the
application. In this case, a contract clusters the possible
actions of an application into two sets: “likely actions” and
“unlikely actions”. In this scenario, an unlikely action that is
performed several times should be considered a misbehavior.
The disadvantages of the dynamic generation is the higher
number of false positives, since some good actions may not
be included in the contract if, during the learning phase,
some good actions have not been performed.
A contract can be formally certified, i.e. it is coupled with
a proof that certifies that the contract matches the application
behavior (e.g., proof-carrying-code). Otherwise, a contract
can be digitally signed (without a formal proof) and, in this
case, the only form of guarantee is the trustworthiness of the
signer. A contract can be self-generated, i.e. there is no proof
that it matches the application behavior. Finally, a contract
can be missing: in fact, in some case, a contract is not
necessary, e.g. when a policy is enforced regardless of the
contract which can be used only to save computational time
on the final node and the final node checks if the contract
matches the policy.
The contract can be generated by (i) the developers; (ii)
the distributor (e.g., marketplace); (iii) third-party certifica-
tion authority; (iv) by the user. If a contract is missing, it
maybe useful to generate the behavior from the code to see if
it matches the policy before running it. Any combinations of
the previous points is possible and, in any case, the contract
can be generated either statically or dynamically.
Let us consider A the set of possible actions for an
application α and C the set of actions described in a contract
γ for α. Considering the relationship between A and C,
the contract γ can be: (i) redundant: A ⊂ C. The contract
γ over-approximates the set of legal actions of α: when
matching the run-time behavior with the contract, no false
positives are generated but false negatives may arise. As
previously said, this is usually the kind of contracts that
are generated statically, since a static analysis (e.g., data-
flow analysis) always returns safe assumptions; (ii) under-
specified: the contract under-approximates the set of legal
action (false positives may be generated at run-time and also
false negatives, but usually less than in the first case). This is
usually the kind of contract that are dynamically generated,
since not all the legal behaviors may have been generated;
(iii) exact: this would theoretically perfectly matche the
application’s behavior.
If a formal proof of the contract-application matching
application is missing, then the compliance of an application
with its contract has to be verified. An application α is
compliant with the contract γ when all the actions of the
application are included in the contract, i.e.:
α |= γ
We say that an application α is compliant with a proba-
bility ξ to the contract γ if any action performed by α is in
the contract and happens with a probability greater or equal
to θ = 1− ξ, i.e:
α |=ξ γ
The definition of probabilistic compliance suits better
to the dynamic generation of contracts. In fact, contracts
defined using dynamically-generated behaviors may be prob-
abilistic as well and, since they are built upon execution
traces, it is possible to compute the probability that each
action is performed, including a quantitative information in
the contract. Probabilistic contracts are easily described with
Markov Chain models [3].
III. PICARD: A FRAMEWORK FOR PROBABILISTIC
CONTRACT ON ANDROID
In this section, we describe PICARD (ProbabIlistic Con-
tract on AndRoiD), which is a framework that exploits the
dynamic approach for contract generation discussed in the
previous Section to define a contract through probabilistic
automata.
In the following, we consider that any application trace is
a sequence of system calls and that multiple traces can then
be combined together.
A. Contract Generation
During its lifetime, a process issues several system calls,
which form a trace, i.e. an ordered sequence of system calls.
If we consider each system call as a node of an oriented
graph, whose edges represents the transition from a system
call to the next one in the original trace, then it is possible
to provide a signature of the application behavior by trans-
forming the original trace in an oriented graph. Hence, since
during a trace execution a system call can be issued several
times consecutively, the graph also includes ears, which are
edges outgoing and ingoing into the same node. Moreover,
each edge is labelled with a sequence number that represents
the position in the trace of a transition, allowing a complete
description of the execution trace itself. This graph type
is known in graph theory as multi-graph. PICARD revises
this well-known representation for application behavior by
introducing the concept of node clustering and applying
elements of probabilistic contract theory.
We introduce the notion of ActionNode, which is a cluster
of related system calls, i.e. the graph of system calls that are
consecutively issued in the trace and that are bound by some
relation and that form an action (a high-level operation). In
general, any relation can be used, e.g. any partition of the
set of system calls in several subsets. In our scenario, the
relation should produce a meaningful action: as an example,
an ActionNode can be composed by the multi-graph of the
system calls performed consecutively on the same file, where
the relation is the fact that all these system call work on the
same file descriptor to produce a relevant action.
As an example of ActionNode, consider the sequence
of system calls: open(A) - read(A) - close(A),
where A is the filename. This ActionNode represents at
high level the action of reading data from file A: this action
requires that, firstly, the file has to be opened, then data
is read and, finally, the file is closed. Some examples of
ActionNodes are depicted in Fig. 1.
Figure 1: Four Examples of ActionNodes
Several advantages stem for this representation: if we
transform the original execution graph using ActionNodes,
then an application trace can be seen as a graph whose
nodes are actions, and this representation is more meaningful
and expressive than a trace whose nodes are just system
calls. In fact, generally a program executes several system
calls that, taken as standalone in the trace, only give limited
information about the application behavior. This is due to the
fact that, usually, there hundreds of system calls on a mobile
OS, but generally a program executes only few of them,
repeatedly. If we represent a trace with a graph where each
node is a different system call, then the program behavior
is represented through a graph with few nodes and a lot of
edges that, usually, form a full mesh. Using ActionNodes,
the framework can define a larger number of nodes, hence
more detailed signatures.
When defining contracts, if we focus on n system calls
(the critical ones), the maximum theoretical number of
ActionNodes that can be achieved is:
maxbn =
n∑
k=1
n!
k!(n− k)!k
2
An ActionNode can contain up to n distinct nodes and the
number of possible ActionNodes is given by the sum of
possible dispositions, with an increasing number k of nodes.
Moreover, each node may have a number of outgoing arcs
that may vary from 0 to k and, hence, each number of
dispositions should be multiplied for k2. Notice that maxbn
is a theoretical upper bound, which should never be reached
due to the semantics of the action. For example, it is strongly
unlikely that a program performs a close system call on
a file and then start to read it with the read system call.
Hence, several ActionNodes should not exist actually. As we
describe in Sect. V, the number of ActionNodes generated
in a normal execution trace is much lower than maxbn.
Hence, just the presence, or the absence, of one or more
ActionNodes in an application trace constitutes a signature
of the application.
The nodes that compose an ActionNode, i.e. system
calls, will be called henceforth SysCallNodes. In the fol-
lowing, we consider as SysCallNodes system calls that act
on files, namely the open, read, write, close,
ioctl, system calls.
B. Algorithm to Define the Probabilistic Contract
To define the contract, the PICARD’s algorithm takes
as input all the generated application traces and outputs
a probabilistic automaton. When traversing the aggregated
traces, from the first to the last system call, the algorithm
checks, for each node, if the argument is the same of the
previous one. Since the monitored system calls act on files,
then the argument is the filename (or file descriptor). Then, a
new ActionNode is created each time a system call is issued
with an argument that differs from the previous system call
(see Fig. 2).
Figure 2: Creation of a new ActionNode
Different and subsequent system calls with the same
argument are inserted in the same ActionNode (Figure 3).
After an ActionNode is generated, an edge is added from the
previous ActionNode to the current one. Hence, the system
call traces are represented by a multi-graph of ActionNodes.
This multi-graph contains an ActionNode for each high-level
operation. The ActionNodes are oblivious of the file-name,
meaning that the same cluster of operations, performed
on two different files, generate the same ActionNode. The
multi-graph may contain also several edges insisting on the
same node, if an ActionNode is visited more than once.
Figure 3: Insertion of a New Node in an ActionNode
Finally, from the multi-graph, an automaton is built that
contains the same nodes of the multi-graph, but the edges
ending on the same node are collapsed inyo a single edge.
Each edge is labelled with the probability that it is traversed
by taking into account the number of occurrences of each
edge. More specifically, each edge (i, j) reports the prob-
ability of reaching directly (in a single step) the node j
from the node i. It is worth noticing that this automaton can
be described by means of a Markov-Chain, whose states
are the ActionNodes of the application, and the transition
matrix reports the probabilities of the automaton edges. This
probabilistic automaton is used to define the probabilistic
contract of the application behavior. It should be noted that,
in a real-world scenario, the contract should be defined by
the developers of the applications, so that all the possible
states and transitions are explored.
IV. CONTRACT COMPLIANCE
Once an application contract has been defined, through
the algorithm described in the previous Section, PICARD
exploits the contract to verify the compliance of the ap-
plication at run-time, e.g. to verify that an application has
not been maliciously repackaged. Repackaged applications
are apps that have been modified by developers adding
to the original code some code that performs malicious
actions. The repackaged application is then distributed as
it was the original one. The rationale behind the PICARD
approach is that these misbehaviors, even if small, should
be actions, or sequences of actions, that are not part of the
contract. Hence, the misbehavior should be recognized and
eventually stopped before it can harm the user or the device.
At run-time, PICARD incrementally builds the monitored
application behavior: a misbehavior is performed when an
application is in a state of the contract’s automaton that is
strongly unlikely.
Markov Chain is used to model stochastic process with
the following property:
Pr{Xti+1 = iti+1|Xti = iti , Xti−1 = iti−1, . . . , X0 = i0} =
Pr{Xti+1 = iti+1|Xti = iti}
As explained in the former Section, probabilities are com-
puted by counting the number of outgoing edges from a
node, ignoring the sequence. Hence, it can be easily verified
that for the PICARD contracts the Markov property holds.
For any t  T , where T is the set of time steps, and for
any i  S where S is the set of possible states. Hence,
Markov Chain are used to model stochastic processes where
the probability of being in a state i only depends from the
former one. The probability of transition from one state i
to another state j is described by the numbers pi,j . These
numbers form a matrix of size m ×m , m = #(S) called
transition matrix P .
In PICARD, the probabilistic contract is composed of Ac-
tionNodes where edges are labelled with transition probabil-
ities. Hence, each ActionNode is a state in a Markov Chain
transition matrix, and m is the number of ActionNodes in
the contract. In a Discrete Markov Chain, the probability of
being in each state i at the step n is computed as the i-th
element of the vector:
p(n) = p(0)Pn
where p(0) is the initial state vector, representing the prob-
ability that the system starts in a specific state.
PICARD defines three levels of contract violation. In
order of severity we have:
• Probability Misbehavior: The probability of being in
the current state is very low but non null. Given a
threshold 0 < θ < 1, if pni < θ, then a misbe-
havior is detected. The value of θ is parametric with
respect to the length of the considered subtrace and
the probabilities on the edges. This means that the
application is performing several times an action that is
strongly unlikely. For example, consider an application
that has to send an SMS after the installation for
registration purposes. In the probabilistic contract of
such an application the “send SMS” operation should
be considered strongly unlikely, since it happens only
once. If a repackaged version of this app, starts to
send several SMS, the framework should detect such
a misbehavior.
• Missing-Edge Misbehavior: the probability of being in
the current state i is zero, because the edge from j to
i does not exist in the contract, where j is the state at
the step n − 1. This is the case of a mimicry attack.
The application performs normal high-level operations,
not considered dangerous as standalone, but that may
harm the device if performed in a specific malicious
sequence. The malicious sequence should never appear
in the contract and the misbehavior should be detected.
• Missing-ActionNode Misbehavior: the probability of
being in the current state i is zero, because the current
state (ActionNode) does non exist in the contract.
This means that an unknown high-level operation has
been performed. This is the strongest misbehavior. In
the case of a repackaged application, this ActionNode
constitutes a high-level operation such as sending an
SMS, or accessing to a system file, which is never
performed on the original version.
Anytime PICARD detects a contract violation, it is up to
the system policy to decide which rule to apply, e.g. stopping
the application, send an alert to the user, and so on.
V. TESTS
To test the effectiveness of our approach, we have built
a first prototype implementation of PICARD to (i) define
the contracts from the application traces and (ii) check
the compliance of the applications’ run-time behavior with
respect to their contract. To test the efficacy of PICARD,
we have analyzed two case studies: (i) proof-of-concept of
repackaged applications, by updating all the sample applica-
tions provided with the Android SDK); (ii) real applications
and their repackaged version, found on official market and
on malware archive site.
In the following we focus on one example for each class.
Repackaged Application: One proof-of-concept appli-
cation that we tested is a Tic Tac Toe sample application
provided with the Android SDK. We modified the applica-
tion code to perform a malicious unwanted behavior. The
modified application sends an SMS message to a specific
number each time the user opens the menu to change the
game skin, slowly leaking the money credit. The SMS is
sent stealthily, since Android does not advise the user when
an SMS is sent by an application. Moreover, the messages
sent by an application are not stored in the message outbox,
hence there is no trace left of the occurred event, except
for the leaked money. It is worth noticing that the unwanted
SMS sending is a typical misbehavior of several malware
that can be found in repackaged applications [4].
Firstly, PICARD records several application traces, which
are modeled using a multi-graph representation, and then
it generates the probabilistic contract of the original Tic
Tac Toe game (i.e. the not malicious application). Then,
PICARD explores the multi-graph representation to build
the ActionNodes and to compute the probabilities of each
transition among ActionNodes and, finally, it outputs the
contract. To build a representative graph, the traces have
been recorded trying to explore all of the game features.
Then, PICARD recorded further game traces of both the
original game and of the malicious one. In each trace the
graphic skin was changed at least once to trigger the SMS
sending in the malicious application.
In Figure 4a we report the PICARD probabilistic automa-
ton extracted from the traces of the original application.
This automaton constitutes the probabilistic contract that
has to be compared to other traces, whose compliance has
to be proved. Each node represents a specific file high-
level operation (or action), which is a sequence of related
system calls on the same file. Each edge is labelled with
the probability of transition from the previous ActionNode
to the next one. Since the Tic Tac Toe game is a very
simple application, the number of states is relatively small.
The automaton in Figure 4b represents the execution of the
malicious version of the game. We set the value of the
threshold θ has a function of the length of the considered
subtrace and the minimum of the probabilities of the edges
from the first node of the current subtrace to the current
node.
At run-time, PICARD incrementally builds the execution
graph of the monitored applications through ActionNodes,
any time an action is performed. As explained in Sect. IV,
when checking the run-time behavior of an application, the
case of a ActionNode that is missing in the contract is the
most suspicious one. A missing ActionNode represents, in
fact, a new high-level operation performed by the moni-
tored application that is not included in the contract. The
automaton of the malicious trace of the Tic Tac Toe game
is much more complex than the one of the original version.
ActionNodes of the original version are composed of no
more than two SysCallNodes, due to the simplicity of the
application. Instead, in the malicious trace, several new high-
level operations have been detected. An example of missing
ActionNode in the contract is number 11 of Figure 4b, which
is shown in Fig. 5. In this case, the non-compliance of
the trace with the contract is verified since this operation
is not included in the contract. We would like to point
out that, by using a representation without ActionNodes,
then this difference between the two traces may have gone
been undetected. In fact, both the original and the malicious
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Figure 4: Automaton Traces
trace use all of the monitored system calls, but only the
malicious one use them to perform malicious actions that
are easily identified through the ActionNode representation.
Furthermore, several times a probability misbehavior has
been detected as well as missing-edge misbehaviors.
On the other hand, all the traces of the original application
have been reported as compliant with the contract, i.e. no
false positives have been raised.
open
read
ioctl
close
Figure 5: ActionNode 11 in the malicious trace.
Trojanized Applications: The effectiveness of PICARD
in detecting repackaged applications has been proved on
real applications downloaded from the official market. We
report here the results on the game Baseball Superstars
2010, which is a complex baseball simulation game. We
found a repackaged version of the same game, which has
an observable behavior identical to the one of the original
application. However, the repackaged version is infected by
a Trojan malware called Geinimi. The malware steals private
user data, like the IMEI code, and tries to send them to an
attacker via SMS or Internet.
To build a representative probabilistic contract, several
traces have been collected by PICARD while playing the
game for several hours, exploring the various play modes.
The probabilistic automaton extracted from these executions
graph has 13 states, hence, the type of operations concerning
the monitored system calls is comparable with the one of the
simpler Tic Tac Toe game. However, the number of edges
is much higher and the probabilities on each edge have a
higher variance than in the Tic Tac Toe automaton. This
correctly depicts the higher complexity of the real applica-
tion with respect to the proof of concept formerly analyzed.
Detecting non-compliant behavior may result more difficult
with the increase of the application complexity. However,
PICARD proved to be effective also in this case. PICARD
has monitored several traces of the genuine application and
several traces of the repackaged version.
The traces of the repackaged application resulted in the
generation of four ActionNodes that are not contained in
the contract. These misbehaviors are related to the various
attempt to access the IMEI code of the phone. The IMEI
code can be exploited by an attacker to clone the USIM of
the device. Due to the insurgence of this unknown, malicious
operations, the application is not considered compliant with
the contract and is recognized as repackaged. As in the
previous experiment, several probability misbehaviors and
missing-edge misbehaviors have been detected.
To check the specificity of PICARD, some traces of
the original application have been extracted. None of these
traces have been used to build the contract. PICARD classi-
fied all of these traces as compliant with the contract. In all
the experiments, no false positives have been raised. Finally,
the run-time performance overhead of PICARD is negligible.
VI. RELATED WORK
[5] proposes Crowdroid, an IDS that is based on the
number of system calls issued by an application. Misbe-
haviors are identified by applying computational intelligence
techniques. However, such a system may be deceived by
low-profile attacks and attacks brought by cooperating ma-
licious apps. Another system that exploits system calls and
computational intelligence is presented in [6], which is an
anomaly-based intrusion detection system that, differently
from Crowdroid, monitors the system globally, but it may
not be able to detect some trojanized application if their
behavior faithfully represents the good ones.
A further system that exploits machine learning to detect
intrusion on Android is Andromaly. Differently from the
previous works that mainly focus on low-level events, e.e.
system calls, Andromaly considers the occurrences of higher
level events and use them to detect intrusion but has been
tested only on proof-of-concept malware. Some Android
security frameworks try to protect the system by monitoring
the communication level and defining security policies. One
of these systems is presented in [7], which allows the defi-
nition of context based security policies. Analysis of system
calls with Markov Models have formerly been performed
on other operating systems. In [8] a scheme for intrusion
detection is proposed. This system exploits system calls and
hidden Markov models and is able to detect efficiently denial
of service attacks. [9] presents another system based upon
system calls and Markov models to detect intrusions. This
system analyzes the arguments of the system calls but is
oblivious of the system call sequence. System call sequence
and deterministic automata have been used in [10] to detect
anomalies, which are detected when system call sequences
differ from an execution trace known to be good.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Repackaged applications are one of the main security
issues for mobile devices. In this paper we have presented
PICARD, a framework to detect repackaged applications
on Android systems through probabilistic contracts. The
contract is represented using a clustered multi-graph, where
each node represents a specific high-level operation, which
is converted into a probabilistic automaton. At run-time, the
application behavior is checked against the contract and a
misbehavior is detected when the application is in a state of
the automaton that has a low or null probability according
to the probabilistic contract. Using a probabilistic approach,
the effectiveness in detecting misbehavior is increased. We
have proved the effectiveness of PICARD by testing the
framework both on repackaged and Trojanized applications.
We are planning to extend this work by increasing the
number of monitored system calls and extending the set of
tested applications and using new relation among system
calls to create ActionNodes based upon a different notion
of relation rather than file descriptor. A further extension is
the extraction of behavioral patterns from the applications,
which can be used to perform black-list-based intrusion
detection of malicious applications.
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